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Abstract 
One of the key challenges in designing expert systems is a credible represen- 
tation of uncertainty and partial belief. During the past deca.de, a number of 
rule-based belief languages were proposed and implemented in applied sys- 
tems. Due to their quasi-probabilistic nature, the external validity of these 
languages is an open question. This paper discusses the theory of belief re- 
vision in expert systems through a canonical belief calculus model which is 
invariant across different languages. A zeta-interpreter for non-categorical 
reasoning is then presented. The purposes of this logic model is twofold: 
first, it provides a clear and concise conceptualization of belief representa- 
tion and propagation in rule-based systems. Second, it serves as a working 
shell which can be instantiated with different belief calculi. This enables 
experiments to investigate the net impact of alternative belief languages on 
the exbernal validity of a fixed expert system. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-89-69 
1 Uncertainty and Expert Systems 
The ability to model uncertainty and belief revision is now considered a key 
challenge in designing credible expert systems. Regardless of whether the 
domain of expertise is medical diagnosis, venture capital, or oil exploration - 
human experts have to cope with uncertain data and inexact decision rules, 
Moreover, it is now an established fact that humans, laymen and experts 
alike, are very poor intuitive statisticians (Tversky and Kahneman, 1341). 
Specifically, human judgement under uncertainty is often irrational, to the 
extent that rationality is equated with the axioms of utility theory and sub- 
jective probability. 
There have been several attempts to represent uncertainty and belief revision 
within the rigid framework of Iogic, with Carnap's (1954) inductive logic [5] 
being the most seminal treatise on the subject. Notwithstanding its signifi- 
cant philosophical contribution, inductive logic was not meant to serve as a 
practical modelling framework. And yet two decades later, Carnap's work on 
the theory of confirmation became the motivation for the certainty factors 
model - a popular belief calculus which was first implemented in 1976 in the 
MYCIN medical diagnosis system (Shortliffe, [30]). Since then, a wide variety 
of belief calculi and non-categorical inference methods were developed and 
implemented by researchers and practitioners. By and large, these methods 
can be classified into two categories: probabilistic, and quasi-probabilistic. 
Probabilist ic methods include such models as Bayes networks (Pearl, [20]), 
influence diagrams (Howa.rd and Matheson, [14]), and the Dempster-Shafer 
theory of evidence (Shafer, [27]). These models enjoy a solid theoretical foun- 
dation; they are either consistent with the axioms of probability theory, or 
they extend it in a clear and explicit manner, as in the case of the Dempster- 
Shafer model. However, it is now well understood that the marriage between 
logical inference and probabilistic inference is rather problematic. First, it 
was shown by Heckerman 1131 and other authors that the modular structure 
of the rule-based architecture is generally inconsistent with the wholistic na- 
ture of a joint distribution function. Second, probabilistic inference in a 
rule-based architecture was shown to be NP-hard (Cooper, [9]). 
Quasi-probabilistic belief-calculi a.re only pa.rtia1ly consistent with the ax- 
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ioms of subjective probability. These calculi include MYCIN7s certainty fac- 
tors model (Shortliffe, [30]), the ad-hoc Bayesian model used in PROSPEC- 
TOR (Duda et al, [ l l]) ,  and an assortment of similar calculi which are es- 
sentially isomorphic although they may differ is some details. Following 
the great popularity of such rule-based shells as EMYCIN, M.1, and AL/X, 
quasi-probabilistic belief calculi became the de-facto method of handling un- 
certainty in applied expert systems. And yet the algebraic structure of these 
pragmatic models is quite obscure, and their limitations and full potential 
are not well-understood by practitioners and knowledge engineers. 
This paper has three purposes. First, it gives a formal description of the 
structure of a belief calculus and how it may be integrated with the overall 
architecture of a rule-based system. Second, the paper presents a method- 
ology designed to test the controversial validity of alternative belief calculi. 
The question of whether or not a belief calculus credibly represents (or im- 
proves) human judgement under uncertainty is of utmost importance, and 
it may be answered only through experimentation with human subjects. In 
order to run such experiments, one needs a canonical rule-based architecture 
which can easily accommodate different belief calculi. This leads to the third 
purpose of the paper, which is the development of a Prolog meta-interpreter, 
called SOLVE, for non-categorical reasoning. SOLVE is useful in that (a) it 
gives a clear computational definition of a belief calculus, and, (b) it provides 
a platform for carrying out experiments with alternative belief calculi. 
Although the presentation of SOLVE involves a certain degree of logic pro- 
gramming, the major concern of this paper is the theory of rule-based belief 
calculi, and the software engineering issues related to their integration with 
rule-based logic models. The implementation details of SOLVE and related 
predicates are presented in a separate appendix. This technical material is 
intended for readers who are interested in Prolog. 
2 Rule-based inference and Belief Languages 
The mat hematical and cognitive underpinnings of rule- based (production) 
systems are well-known, and the reader is referred to Davis and King [22] 
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and to  Newel1 (181 for extensive discussions. Due to its proximity to  first- 
order predicate calculus, the rational basis of categorical rule-based inference 
is normally unchallenged. This validity, however, does not extend naturally 
to  applications involving uncertain facts and heuristic inference rules. Under 
such conditions, rule-based inference becomes an inexact, non-categorical, 
classification procedure, designed to map an observed phenomenon on a set 
of one or more explaining hypotheses (Cohen, 171). This inexact matching 
algorithm is carried out by applying modus ponens repeatedly to a set of 
rules of the form IF e THEN h WITH DEGREE OF BELIEF Bel, which, 
from now on, we denote e -+ h # Bel'. The postfix Bel is a degree of 
belief, which, broadly speaking, reflects an expert's confidence in the logical 
entailment associated with the implication e -+ h. The problem, simply put, 
is this: given the prior belief in h and all the degrees of belief that parameterize 
rules and facts which ultimately imply h, how does one compute the posterior 
belief in h? In expert systems, this is typically accomplished by some sort of 
a belief calculus. 
As the rule-based inference-engine processes rules which ultimately imply 
an hypothesis, a belief calculus is applied to update the posterior belief in 
this hypothesis. The process normally terminates when the belief in one or 
more hypotheses exceeds a certain pre-defined cutoff value. Therefore, a non- 
categorical belief calculus may be viewed as a "scoring" algorithm, a term 
coined by Cooper [8]. This algorithm accepts a set of inexact rules and a 
set of uncertain data, and goes on to "score" a set of competing hypotheses, 
i.e. compute their posterior beliefs. There exist conditions under which the 
resulting scores are probabilities, but this is not always the case. 
According to Shafer and Tversky 1281, the building-blocks of a belief language 
are syntax, calculus, and semantics. In the context of rule-based inference, 
syntax corresponds to the set of degrees of belief which parameterize uncer- 
tain facts, inexact rules, and prospective hypotheses. The degrees of belief 
associated with rules are elicited from domain experts as the knowledge-base 
is being constructed. The degrees of belief which parameterize observed or 
suspected pieces of evidence are obtained interactively through consultation. 
Posterior degrees of belief are computed through a set of operators collec- 
'throughout the paper, e and h stand for a piece of evidence and a n  hypothesis, 
respectively 
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tively known as a belief calculus. We take the position that the semantics of 
the language consists of either a normative or a descriptive argument which 
justifies the validity of the syntax and calculus dimensions of the language. 
2.1 A Canonical Belief Calculus 
In order to propagate degrees of belief in a rule-based architecture consist- 
ing of uncertain facts and inexact rules, a belief calculus must be capable of 
handling three generic types s f  reasoning: Boolean conditioning, sequential 
propagation, and parallel combination. This section gives canonical defini- 
tions of each of these cases. Elsewhere in the paper we present language- 
dependant instantiations of these models and give their corresponding logic 
programming implementations. 
Let h, el, and ez be an huypothesis and two pieces of evidence with cur- 
rent beliefs Bel(h), Bel(el), and Bel(e2), respectively. A non-categorical 
inference mechanism must be capable of computing the posterior belief in 
h, denoted Bel(hl.), in light of any recursive combination of the following 
generic evidential rela.tionships: 
Boolean cond i t i on ing :  ( e l  OR e2) -> h # Be1 
( e l  AND e 2 )  -> h # Be1 
s e q u e n t i a l  p ropaga t ion :  e l  -> e2 # B e l l  
e2  -> h # Be12 
P a r a l l e l  combinat ion:  e l  -> h # Bell 
e2  -> h # Be12 
The exact specification of how to compute the posterior belief in h in any 
one of the above circumsta.nces is precisely the definition of a belief calculus. 
Although the details of such specifications va.ry greatly across different belief 
languages, the basic structure of their underlying calculi is quite invariant. 
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This observation leads to the notion of a canonical belief calculus, whose three 
components are described next. 
Boolean Conditioning: Consider the rules (el or e2) -+ h #Bell and (el 
and e2) -+ h #BeE2. The degrees of belief Bell and Be12 represent the 
strengths of the rules if both el-and el are known to be certain. But what 
if one or both of these pieces of evidence is uncertain? In such cases, the 
belief calculus first computes the current belief associated with the premise 
of each rule, i.e. Bel((el and e2)) and Bel((el or e2)). Technically speaking, 
this computation is carried out through the template functions F-and and 
F-or, respectively: 
Once the current belief in a rule's premise is established trough Boolean 
conditioning, the posterior belief in the rule's conclusion ca.n be computed 
through sequential propaga.tion. 
Sequential Propagation: Rule-based belief calculi make the implicit assump- 
tion that the "actual" degree of belief in a rule has to cha.nge when the belief 
in the rule's premise changes. Specifically, let e -4 h #Bel(h, e) be a rule 
specifying that "given e (with certainty), h is implied to a degree of belief 
Bel(h, e)," and let the current belief in e be Bel(e). When a rule-based 
inference engine operates on a knowledge-base, the premise e might be ei- 
ther (a) a terminal fact whose prior belief Bel(e) is specified by the user, or, 
(b) an intermediate sub-hypothesis whose current belief Bel(e1.) was already 
computed by the system. 
Whichever category e falls in, the "a.ctua1" degree of belief in the rule, de- 
noted Bell(h,e), is computed through a. va.ria.nt of the following sequential 
propagation function, Fs: 
Bell(h, e) = Fs(Bel(e) ,  Bel(h, e)) 
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The function F-s is monotonically increasing in both variables Bel(e) and 
Bel(h,e). Therefore, F-s is sometimes referred to in the A1 literature as 
an "attenuation function," designed to carry over the uncertainty associated 
with a rule's premise into the uncertainty associated with the rule itself. 
pa.ralle1 Combination: Let h be an hypothesis with current degree of belief 
Bel(h) and let el -+ h #Bel(h, el) and e2 4 h #Bel(h, e2) be two rules 
that bear evidence on h independently. The combined, posterior belief in 
h in light of {el, e 2 )  is given by the following binary parallel combination 
function, F-p: 
Bel(h, {el, e2)) = F-p(Bel(h), Bel(h., el), BeE(h, e2)) (4) 
(it is implicitly assumed that Bel(h, el) and Bel(h, e2) were already attenu- 
ated by F s ) .  In order to  free the inference process from order and clustering 
effects, the function F-p is normally required to be commutative and asso- 
ciative. If these requirements are satisfied, the binary F-p function can be 
extended recursively to an n-ary parallel combination function. The details 
of this extension are straightforward. 
We now proceed to describe the C F  calculus and the likelihood-ratio Bayesian 
calculus. These models are presented verbatim, and no attempt is made here 
to either defend their cognitive appeal or argue for or against their normative 
justification. Such analyses were carried out by Adams (11, Heckerman 1131, 
Grosof [12], Schocken and Icleindorfer 1251, and other authors. 
2.2 The Certainty Factors Language 
Following its initial implementation in MY CIN, the certainty-factors calculus 
has evolved into several forms, a.11 of which may be easily incorporated into 
the architecture described in this paper. The calculus discussed here adheres 
to  the original model, described in detail by Buchanan and Shortliffe 141. 
In the additive CF syntax, a dia.gnostic rule of the form e -4 h #CF(hle) 
means that e increases the belief in h by the ma,gnitude CF(h1e) which 
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varies from -1 to 1. If e is irrelevant to h, CF(h1e) = 0. The extreme 
case of e being sufficiently convincing to confirm (disconfirm) h in cer- 
tainty is modeled through CF(h1e) = 1 (CF(h1e) = -1). There are ba- 
sically two types of certainty-factors. The CF7s  associated with rules (e.g. 
paci f is t (X)  -+ democrat(X) #0.9) are elicited from a domain expert when 
the rule-base is being constructed. The CF's associated with uncertain facts 
(e.g. p c i  fisb(jm) #O.E;) are supplied through consultation. 
Boolean Conditioning: Consider the categorical disjunctive rule (el or e2) -+ 
h which reads: either one of the two pieces of evidence el or ez (known in 
certainty) can alone establish the hypothesis h. How does one extend this 
rule to situations in which either el or ez are uncertain? this question is 
complicated by the observation that the uncertainty associated with these 
facts is not a probability, but, rather, an abstract measure of human be- 
lief. Iiahneman and Miller [15] have argued that, under these circumstances, 
the most reasonable rule for Boolean combination is the one used in fuzzy 
logic (Zadeh, [35]). This rule, which was implemented in MYCIN, sets the 
belief in a colljunction (disjunction) to the minimal (maximal) belief in its 
constituents: 
Sequential combination: The CF associated with the diagnostic rule e -+ 
-- 
h #CF(hIe) is elicited from a domain expert under the assumption that the 
premise e is known wit11 certainty. \Vhen the belief in e is less than certainty, 
the CF calculus attenuates the rule's degree of belief through the following 
sequential propagation function: 
CF(h  le) CF(e )  if CF(e)  > 0 CFt(h/e)  = { 
otherwise 
Parallel cornhination: When two rules el -+ h #CF(hlel) and e2 -+ 
h #CE(hle2) bear evidence on IL independently, their compound increased 
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belief in h in light of {el, e2} is computed through a binary combination 
function, defined as follolvs: 
I CF(hle1) + CF(hle2) . (1 - CF(hlel)) if both CF's are positive { -(ICF(hle~)l + ICF(hle2)l . (1 - ICF(hlel)j) if both CF's are negative 
if the CF's have mixed signs 
2.3 The Bayesian Language 
In Bayesian languages, a rule of the form h --t e #Be1 reads: the hypothesis 
h causes the evidence e with a degree of belief Bel. There exist several differ- 
ent interpretation of Bel. Some Bayesian systems elicit and propagate con- 
ditional probabilities of the form Be1 = P(el h). A more balanced Bayesian 
design would record not only P(elh) but also ~ ( e l x ) ,  leading to the two-place 
degree of belief Be1 = [P(el h), ~ ( e l x ) ] .  Finally, the likelihood-ratio Bayesian 
syntax consists of likelihood-ratios of the form Be1 =  el h)/p(elx). If the 
prior-odds on h ,  P(h)/P('7;), is known, then Bayes rule dictates that the pres- 
ence of e will change the posterior odds on h to P (h ) /P (x )  - ~ ( e l h ) / ~ ( e l f j ; ) .  
Hence, the Bayesian syntax is multiplicative, unlike the C F  syntax, which is 
additive. 
Recall that our ultimate purpose is to develop a canonical meta-interpreter 
which can accommodate a wide variety of different belief calculi. With that 
in mind, we'll focus on a general Bayesian language in which the degree of 
belief Be1 which parameterizes the rule h --, e #Be1 is taken to be the 
3-place list [P(A), P(elh), ~ ( e l x ) ] .  If e is a terminal piece of evidence, the 
degree of belief in e is taken to be Bel = P(e). 
Boolean Conditioning: In qua.si-probabilistic Bayesian systems, e.g. 
PROSPECTOR, the current belief in conjunctions and disjunctions involving 
uncertain propositions is computed through the same fuzzy logic conventions 
used in MYCIN: 
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Sequential propa.gation: The literature contains several heuristic procedures 
for Bayesian sequential belief update, e.g. Jeffsies rule of conditioning (Shafer, 
1261) and PROSPECTOR'S interpolaiion function (Duda et al, [ll]).  For 
the sake of brevity, we choose to describe here a simple interpolation func- 
tion, discussed by Wise [36]. Suppose the knowledge-base contains the rule 
h -, e #[P(h), P(elh), ~ ( e l A ) ]  and we find out through consultation that 
the piece of evidence e obtains with the current belief P(e). Before we can 
calculate the impact of e on the posterior belief in h, we attenuate the rule's 
degree of belief as follows: 
This gives the "actual" rule's degree of belief, [P(h), P1(elh), ~ ' ( e l x ) ] .  Note 
that (11) is a weighted average of P(elh) and P ( ~ l h ) ,  weighted by P(e)  and 
P(z). (12) is similar. 
Parallel combination: Let h + el #Bell, . . - , h + en #Beln be n causal 
rules with (already attenuated) degrees of belief Bel; = [P(h), P(el h), P(elK)]. 
The posterior belief in h in light of the evidence {el, . . ,en)  is computed 
through the following version of (the commutative and associa.tive) Bayes 
rule: 
products-odds = P(ellh),  . .. . P(enlh) 
~ ( e t l 7 i )  ' ' p(en17i) 
P(h)  odds = proclucts-odds . -
P(E) 
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The posterior belief in h, P(hl.), may be derived through the simple trans- 
formation: 
odds P(h1.) = 1 + odds 
3 On the Validity of Belief Languages 
As the previous section illustrates, the C F  and the Bayesian languages offer 
two different representations of uncertainty and partial belief. At the same 
time, one would hope that the behavior of a CF-based expert system would 
be compatible with that of a Bayesian expert system, all other things held 
equal (including the expert and tlze knowledge-base). This hypothesis can be 
tested only through experimentation. The design of such experiments and 
the computational tools which are necessary to support them are discussed 
in this section. 
Consider the familiar problem of rating prospective dates and managing a 
little black book. Suppose a person, denoted hereafter dater, wishes to deter- 
mine whether 01- not another person is a good match for a blind-date, based 
on a single telephone conversation. For the sake of simplicity, let's assume 
that the dater's rationale is represented t,hrougll the following CF-oriented 
knowledge- base: 
good,looking(X) o r  s m a r t  (x) 
-> date(X) # 0 .8 .  
This knowledge-base has the following interpretation: [I] is a wishful (and 
inexact) conjecture that blind-daters typically nial<e and then learn that they 
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should have known better. 121 is an inexact rule of thumb which models the 
dater's social preferences. [3] is a certain fact about Leslie. S/he sounds good 
over the telephone. Fact [4] is an inexact estimate of Leslie's IQ. 
We see that not unlike other domains of expertise, the dater's "knowledge" 
and perception of reality are heuristic and subjective, respectively. In the 
rule-based architecture of 11-41, this non-determinism is represented by the 
degrees of belief following the # symbol. Note, however, that barring these 
numbers, [I-41 may be readily translated to a standard logic model. Let's 
assume that this model is implemented in Prolog, and consider the following 
query: 
Prolog's response to this query will be the laconic and rather unproductive 
result "Yes." Under the given semantics, this means: "go ahead and date 
Leslie." We think that most dakers would reject this black and white di- 
chotomy in favor of a finer and more informative matcher. In particular, 
let's assume that (a) the # degrees of belief in [I-41 were reinstated, and, (b) 
a certainty-factors oriented meta-interpreter called SOLVE were available. 
Under these conditions, the original query may be recast as the following 
meta-query: 
solve (date(les1ie) , Bel) ? 
To which Prolog will answer: 
Yes, Bel=O. 56 
Like standard Prolog, SOLVE attempts to prove the goal date(leslie), search- 
ing for facts and rules which imply this hypothesis categorically. In the pro- 
cess of constructing this proof, however, SOLVE also collects degrees of 
belief relevant to Leslie and fuses them into Bel, the posterior belief in the 
proposition date(les1ie). In a meta-interpreter environment, the Be1 variable 
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is bound and updated on the fly, as a side-effect of the ordinary inference 
process. 
The preceding discussion made the implicit assumption that SOLVE has a 
built-in belief calculus. In other words, the belief calculus is assumed to be a 
fixed part of SOLVE'S theory. However, in view of Sterling's [31] principles 
of mixing flavors, it is far more tasteful to define a stand-alone belief calculus, 
say c, and pass it on to the SOLVE meta-interpreter as a parameter. In this 
form, the query solve(h, Bel, c) consists of a request to confirm an hypothesis, 
h, and compute its posterior belief, Bel, modulo the belief calculus, c. 
For example, let cf and b be two complex predicates which implement the 
certainty-fa.ctors and the Bayesian ca.lculus, respectively. Assume further 
that the same dater has specified the degrees of belief which parameterize 
[I-41 twice, once as certa.inty factors, and once as conditional probabilities. 
Now consider the following set of queries: 
Suppose that the results of this experiment were x l  > yl and $2 < y2. This 
would indicate that at least one of the belief languages under consideration 
fails to capture the human's preferences. Note that excluding the change in 
the belief calculus and syntax, everything else is kept intact, including Leslie, 
Pat, the dater's preferences, and the inference-engine. Hence, the experiment 
measures the net impact of alternative belief language "treatments" on the 
system's behavior, all other things held equal. 
Shafer a.nd Tversky [2S] note that there axe no formal criteria or general em- 
pirical procedures for evaluating proba.bilistic designs, and go on to conclude 
that "the design and analysis of mental experiments th,erefore represents a 
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challenge to both statisticians and psychologists." The validity of this par- 
ticular experiment must be qualified by two observations: first, the design 
assumes that the knowledge-base remains constant across different belief lan- 
guages. Second, if the results of the experiment were indeed incompatible, it 
would be impossible to say whether this inconsistency was due to the different 
belief calculi or due to the different sets of degrees of belief. Notwithstanding 
the external validity s f  these reservations, they don't diminish the value of 
the experiment. RmfE that om objective is to  test the wholesome impact 
of different belief languages on expert systems, This calls for a simultaneous 
rnanigrrIation of both the syntax and the cdculus across treatments. Fur- 
thermore, in order for this experiment to be internally valid, we must seek 
a task in which the knowledge-base is sufficiently simple to remain constant 
across different belief languages. 
A within-sttbject experiment which follows these guidelines was carried out by 
Schocken 1241. The "'experts" were professors and senior Ph.D. students in a 
decision sciences department. The context was a real-life inference problem 
taken from the domain of faculty recruiting. Ten resumes of hypothetical 
prospective candidates were given to each subject , who rank-ordered them 
in terms of increasing likelihood of potential academic success. Each subject 
then underwent an elaborate knowledge elicitation procedure administered 
by the experimenter, who played the role of a knowledge engineer. The result 
of this interaction was a, rule-base which presumably captured the ranking 
rationale of the human expert. The subjects were then assigned randomly 
to two groups, I and 11. 
Subjects in group I were asked to express their degrees of belief in each rule 
using the certainty factors language, and group I1 subjects expressed their be- 
lief in terms of subjective probabilities. Two months later, the subjects were 
recalled, and the very same sequel ensued: first, each subject generated a sec- 
ond "human ranking" of the (very same) ten candidates. Next, each subject 
was presented with the same rule-base that he or she has provided originally, 
with one exception: the degrees of belief which parameterized the rules were 
omitted. Finally, the knowledge elicitation treatment was switched: subjects 
from groups I and I1 underwent a probabilistic and C F  elicitation, respec- 
tively. This completed the data gathering stage of the experiment. 
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At that  point, two expert systems (per subject) were constructed, using a 
CF and an a Bayesian versions of the SOLVE meta-interpreters. The two 
systems varied only in their dependence on the CF and on the Bayesian 
calculi. The systems were then fed with the subject's rule-base and the 
set of ten (encoded) resumes, and went on to compute the rankings of the 
candidates in terms of certainty factors and posterior probabilities. Note 
that the two systems were identical in their reliance on the same rule-base, 
fact- base, and expert. These factors were tightly controlled, varying only the 
syntax and the belief caIculus "treatment." 
The data, anaIysis paart of the experiment consisted of comparing the various 
rankings of candidates generated by huma.ns and machines, using standard 
statistical rank-correlation t,ests. The correla~tjon between the two "human 
rankings" (which were spaced two months apart) were used to control for 
consistent subjects. The correla.t.ion between human rankings and machine 
rankings were used to test a, series of hypotheses regarding the descriptive 
and external validity of alternative belief languages. 
The descriptive validity of the Bayesian ( C F )  language was estimated through 
the correlation between the human ranking and the Bayesian (CF) machine 
ranking. The external  validity of the Bayesian (CF)  language was estimated 
through the c~rrela~tion between the Bayesian (CF)  ranking and the pooled 
human ranking of those subjects who were professors at  the decision sciences 
department. These professors were actively involved in real hiring decisions, 
and their pooled ranking was therefore viewed as a gold standard against 
which other rankings could be pitted. 
The results of the experiment were son1ewha.t surprising. The CF and the 
Bayesian 1a.ngua.ge scored highly and simila,rly in terms of descriptive validity. 
At the sa.me time, the Ba.yesia,n la.ngua,ge outperformed the CF language in 
terms of external validity. The details of the experiment and the results are 
reported in Schocken 1241, and are somewhat irrelevant to the present paper. 
Our chief concern here is research methodology, and, in particular, the design 
of the meta,-interpreters which enable such experiments. 
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Meta-Interpreters as Logic Models of Ex- 
pert Systems 
The meta-interpreter presented below was developed to support experimen- 
tation with alternative belief languages. The objective was to develop a 
computational environment which (a) simulates a standard rule-based infer- 
ence algorithm, and, (b) allows a great deal of design flexibility with respect 
to creating and modifying alternative belief calculi. In the process of devel- 
oping these tools, we became aware of a paper by Sterling [31] describing 
the analogy between Lisp Flavors and Prolog meta-interpreters. Sterling's 
paper provides an elegant theoretical framework within which our work can 
be described in terms of mixing flavors. 
The basic notion of logic PI-ogrnms with uncertninties is due to a paper of 
this title by Shapiro [29]. In a logic program with uncertainty, rules and 
facts are parameterized by some sort of a degree of belief. The inference 
algorithm is extended to compute posterior beliefs in goals as a side-effect 
of standard reasoning. Belief computations can be performed either within 
the logic program itself (e.g. Clark and h.lcCabe, [6], Alvey et al, [2]), or at 
higher, meta-level of interpretation (Shapiro, [%I). 
A h4eta.-interpreter is an interpreter of a language written in the same lan- 
guage. In Prolog, meta-interpreters have proven to  be particularly useful 
in building expert system shells. The ba.sic idea is that Prolog is already a 
very capable first-order inference-engine; turning this raw power into a full- 
featured shell is basically a, matter of adding functiona,lities to the standard 
language. For the sake of modula.rity, this is best accomplished by creating 
specialized meta-interpreters and en11a.ncing them incrementally (Sterling, 
1311). 
Prolog meta-interpreters were developed to add a. number of essential capabil- 
ities found in most commercial expert system shells. For example, Harnmond 
and Sergot 1191 extended the basic inference-engine with a "query the user" 
facility which obtains missing information through interactive consultation. 
Sterling and Lalee [32] developed techniques to expla,in the system's line of 
reasoning. A number of authors, e.g. Dincbas [lo] and Pereira 1211, have 
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shown how the fixed control structure of Prolog can be short-cut and mod- 
ified t o  suit various inferential needs. Baldwin and Monk [3] developed a 
met a-interpreter for inexact reasoning based on the Demps t er-Shafer model. 
Wirth's [35] software engineering principle of programs = algorithms + data 
structures is well-known. The expert systems analogy of this principle is as 
follows: 
e x p e r t  - knowledge in fe rence  151 
 
system base  + mechanism 
This pa.per takes the modula.rity principle one step further, achieving what 
may be described symbolically a.s: 
i n f e r e n c e  - 
- 
in fe rence  + b e l i e f  161 
mechanism engine c a l c u l u s  
The inference engine was implemented through the SOLVE meta-interpreter, 
which is completely independent of the details of the belief calculus and the 
syntax of the knowledge base. This modularity facilitates comparative ex- 
perimentation with alternative belief calculi, leaving the rest of the system 
intact. For example, consider an experiment designed to compare the recom- 
mendations generated by a CF-based and a Bayesian-based systems. This 
experiment will malce use of two logic models which may be described sym- 
bolically, as follows: 
i n f e r e n c e  - 
..-.., 
SOLVE CF c71 
mechanism1 + c a l c u l u s  
in fe rence  - SOLVE Bayesian 
- 
C81 
mechanism2 + c a l c u l u s  
The remainder of this section presents logic niodels of the two major compo- 
nents of [5] - the knowledge base and the inference mechanism. The glue that 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-89-69 
integrates these components (the + sign) is also discussed. Logic models of 
the certainty factors and the Bayesian calculi are presented in a separate Ap- 
pendix. Due to the modularity of SOLVE, the details of these calculi have 
no impact on the overall architecture, and we therefore delay their discussion 
t o  a later stage. 
4.1 A Canonical Knowledge-base 
This section presents a logic model of a non-categorical knowledge-base. 
From a logic modeling perspective, this knowledge-base is simply a set of 
predicates. In order to merge these predicates with SOLVE'S theory, how- 
ever, some parsing a.nd pre-processing must take place. The discussion of 
these issues serves to highlight the snytachtical differences of the C F  and 
the Bayesian Languages, and the ease by which this pluralism is accommo- 
dated by the SOLVE meta-interpreter. 
Going back to the da,ting exa.mple, consider the following subset of an hypo- 
thetical, CF-oriented, knowledge-base: 
/* ru l e -base  */ 
age(X,Age) and Age>l8 and Age<35 ->  date(^) # 0 . 3 .  
s a l a r y  (X , Salary)  and Salary>75000 o r  
p a r e n t  (X ,Pa ren t )  and s a l a r y  (Pa ren t  ,SalaryP) and 
SalaryP>l50000 
-> r ich(X) # 0 . 9 .  
/* f a c t  base  */ 
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p a r e n t  (nicky ,bob) . 
sa lary(bob,  160000). 
salary (nicky ,20000) # 0 . 8 .  
good-looking (pat )  # 0.95. 
s a l a r y ( p a t  , 0 ) .  
age (pa t ,  24) . 
potent ia l ,da te(nicky)  . 
p o t e n t i a l - d a t e ( p a t )  . 
Figure I 
In order to merge this knowledge-base with the meta-interpreter, we have to  
convert its rules and facts into a generic clausal form consistent with Prolog's 
syntax. The strategy taken here is to (a) convert inexact rules of the form 
e -4 IL #Be1 into the generic clause ( 1 2 ,  e,Bel), and, (b) convert uncertain 
facts of the form e #Be1 into the generic clause (e,true, Bel), The generic 
clause is important because this is the only data structure that SOLVE 
recognizes. 
Since the direction of rules and the semantics of degrees of belief vary across 
different belief languages, each language requires a specialized parser. The 
rema.inder of this section presents a certainty-factors parser and a Bayesian 
parser. The section concludes with some genera1 remarks on other functions 
which may be incorpora'ted in more sophisticated parsers. 
A Certainty-factors Parser: A knowledge-base with certainty-factors is trans- 
lated into generic clauses through the following pa.rser: 
parse(H,E,Bel) :- (E -> H # Bel) . 
parse (E , t rue ,Be l )  :- (E # Bel)  . 
p a r s e ( E , t r u e , l )  :- E. 
This code reads as follo\vs: [9] ma,tches the rule E -4 H #Be1 with the 
clause ( H ,  E,  Bel). [lo] matches the uncertain fact E #Be1 with the clause 
(E,  true, Bel). Fina.lly, certa.in facts of the form E (with no attached degrees 
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of belief) are defaulted by [ll] to the clause (E, true, 1) which reads: E is 
true with cei-tainty. The latter convention allows us to freely mix certain and 
uncertain facts in the same knowledge-ba.se, and, at the same time, relieves 
us from the tedium of a.ssigning a 1.0 degree of belief to such certain facts as 
parent (nicky, bob). Instea.d, we let the system take care of this nuisance as 
a side-effect of parsing. 
A Bayesian Parser: Recall that in our Bayesian langua,ge, the degree of belief 
Bel which parameterizes the rule h -+ e #Be1 is taken to be the 3-place list 
[P(h), P(elh), ~ ( e l x ) ] .  If e is a terminal piece of evidence, the degree of belief 
in e is taken to be Be1 = P(e).  With that in mind, the Bayesian parser is 
defined as follows: 
parse(H,E,Bel) :- (H -> E # Bel). 
parse(E,true,Bel) : - (E # Bel) 
parse(E,true,[0.9999,1,1]) :- E. 
The meaning of [12] and [13] is identical to their corresponding meaning in 
the C F  parser, but note that the direction of the rule in the right-hand side 
is reversed. MThen the parser detects a certain fact through [14], it defaults 
its prior probability to 0.9999. The difference between this and the more 
plausible 1 is due to an uninteresting tecl2nical detail. 
Similarly to the C F  pa.rser, the role of 112-141 is to translate rules and facts 
into the generic clause (N,E,Bel)  which is recognizable by the SOLVE 
meta-interpreter. Note tha.t no a.ttempt is rna,de here to unpa.ck compound 
degrees of belief into their three individual components. This task is left 
where it belongs - the belief ca,lculus level. This a.ga.in illustrates how a 
modulafdesign can relieve the inference-engine from unnecessary technical 
clutter. 
Other Uses of Parsers: Thoughtful use of parsers and pre-processors allow 
the designer to modify the syntax of a belief language and its corresponding 
knowledge-bases without tinkering with the rest of the system. For example, 
suppose we wish to leave the C F  calculus intact, and, at  the same time, 
elicit degrees s f  belief that vary from -100 to 100 instead of -1 to  1 (this is 
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normally done by most CF knowledge engineers). This leads to rules and 
facts of the form: 
l ikes (X,sush i )  -> date(X) # -10. 
na t iona l i ty (X,  japan) -> l ikes(X,  sush i )  # 90. 
n a t i o n a l i t y  (tomo, j apan). 
Following the standard C F  requirement that degrees of belief be restricted 
to the interval [-I, I], we can pre-process the knowledge-base as follows: 
parse(H,E,Bel) :- (E -> H # B e l l ) ,  
Be1 is Be11/100. 
parse(E, t rue ,Bel)  :- (E # Bel l ) ,  
Be1 i s  Be11/100. 
p a r s e ( E , t m e , l )  :- E .  
One can easily envision other useful applications of PARSE beyond this 
trivial example. In PROSPECTOR, for example, there is a provision for 
representing belief in evidence through qualitative terms, e.g. occasional, 
rare, etc. Those statements are then transformed into probabilities, e.g. 0.1 
and 0.01, respectively (Duda et al, [Ill). In a similar vein, Lichtenstein and 
Newman [16] concluded empirically that verbal descriptions of uncertainty 
may be mapped on ranges of probabilities. These verbal-numeric mappings 
can be made explicit as a side-effect of parsing, through the following syn- 
tactical sugar: 
parse(E,  t r u e  ,Bel) : - (E # Bel-text)  , 
t r ans la te (Be1- tex t  ,Bel) . 
t r ans la te ("occas iona l"  , O .  1 ) .  
t r an s l a t e ( " r a r e "  ,O.OI) . 
e t c .  
To sum up, the parser shields the inference-engine from the syntactical id- 
iosyncra.sies of the underlying belief language. This separation enables us to 
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elicit and represent rules and facts in a variety of forms, and, at  the same 
time, process them through a canonical inference mechanism which operates 
on a collection of generic clauses of the form (H, E, Bel). The details of this 
mechanism are presented in the next section. 
4.2 A Canonical Inference Mechanism 
We assume that any knowledge-base, regardless of how complex, is a recursive 
union of the four generic inferentia.1 structures depicted in the following figure: 
Figure 2 
In a non-categorical knowledge-base, these structures are also parameterized 
by degrees of belief. Hence, the SOLVE meta-interpreter (the inference 
engine) must employ a belief calculus which specifies how to combine degrees 
of belief in the cases of (a) sequential propagation (b) parallel combination 
(c) conjunctive conditioning, and (d) disjunctive conditioning. In section 2.1, 
the functions which specify this calculus were denoted F A ,  F-p, F-and, and 
F-or, respectively. Since we want our meta-interpreter to be independent 
of the calculus, we pass these functions as parameters to SOLVE'S theory. 
The SOLVE predicate if defined as follo\vs: 
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solve((H1 or ~2),Bel,~-s,~-p,F-and,~,or) :- C161 
solve (Hi ,Bell ,F-s, F-p and, F-or) , C171 
solve (H2 ,Be12 ,F-s, F-p , F-and , F-or) , C181 
apply (F-or (Bell, Bel2) J~el] ) . C191 
solve((H1 and H2) ,Be1 ,~,s,~-~,~-and,~-or) :- C201 
solve (HI ,Be1 1 ,F-s, F-p , F-and, F-or) , C2 11 
solve (H2 ,Be12 ,F-s ,F-p, F-and ,F-or) , C221 
apply(F-and(Bel1 ,Bel2) , [Bell ) . C231 
solve(H,Bel,F~s,F~p,F~and,F~or) :- C241 
parse(H, - , Belp) , ! , C251 
bagof (Belx, C261 
(parse (H,E, Bel-rule) , C271 
solve(E,Bel~e,F~s,F~pyF~andyFFor), C281 
apply(F,s,[Bel-e,Bel-rule,Belx)), C291 
Bels) , C301 
apply(F,p, [Belp, Bels, Bell 1. C311 
solve(E,l,F-s,F-p,F-and,F-or) :- E,! 
solve(E,O,F-s,F-p,F-and,F-or). 
The base-fact [15] of SOLVE,  which is ground, assigns a belief of 1 to the 
constant hypothesis true. The subsequen t handling of Boolean conditioning 
in [16-231 is self-explanatory. In [25], PARSE is used to check if the hypoth- 
esis II is present in the knowledge-base, and, if so, to bind Belp to its prior 
belief. The BAGOF predicate accomplishes a few things. First, it looks 
(through parsing) [27] for all the rules E -4 HBelrule  whose conclusion is 
H . For each such rule, SOLT/E= is applied recursively to compute the poste- 
rior belief in the premise E ,  yielding Bcl-e 1281. This current belief, in turn, 
is used by F-p to attenuate the original rule's degree of belief, Belsule,  into 
Belx [29]. Attenuated degrees of belief are strung together (via BAGOF) 
into the list Bels [30]. 
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The "punch line" of SOLVE is 1311. When we get to this point, the list 
Bels consists of all the attenuated degrees of belief associated with all the 
rules whose conclusion is H. Since this list is constructed recursively, Bels 
encapsulates all the evidence tha.t SOLVE drew from all the reasoning chains 
whose ultimate conclusion is H .  At that point, the parallel combination 
function F-p is applied to fuse this informa.tion with the prior belief Belp, 
yielding the ultimate outcome of SOLVE, i.e. the posterior belief in H, Bel. 
To sum up, solve(H, Bel, F-s, F-p, F-and, F-or) implements an exhaustive 
depth-first search, pruning all the rules and facts which bear evidence on 
H ,  either directly or indirectly. As a side-effect of this process, the program 
computes the posterior belief in H modulo the variable belief calculus < 
Fs, F-p, F-and, F-or >. When SOLT/E branches horizontally, F-p is used 
to combine the degrees of belief originating from rules whose direct conclusion 
is H. When SOLVE backtraclcs from a vertical recursive call, F-s is used 
to synthesize the belief committed to I3 from lower-levels of reasoning. If a 
Boolean "fork" is encountered, either F-and or F-or are invoked to compute 
the posterior belief coming out of the fork. 
Note again that the predicates < F s ,  F-p, F-and, F-or > are left unspec- 
ified. This is done in purpose, in order to highlight the modularity and 
top-down design of SOLI/E. In a separate appendix, we give logic models 
of the CF calculus, < c f -s, c f -p, c f -and,  cf -or >, and the Bayesian calculus, 
< b-s, b-p, b-and, b-or >, and explain how they may be bound to SOLVE'S 
theory. 
In the context of 1a.rger logic model, the fully instantiated SOLVE meta- 
interpreter ma.y be viewed as simply yet another predicate. Therefore, one 
can blend SOLVE with other predica.tes in a variety of different ways. For 
example, a.ssume that the dater from Section 4.1 wishes to print a list of dat- 
ing candidates sorted in decreasing order of composite attractiveness. This 
version of the little black book may be crea.ted through the following (CF- 
oriented) predicate: 
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c r e a t e  (Book) : - 
bagof ( (X ,Rating) , 
( ~ o t e n t  i a l - d a t e  (X) , 
solve(date(X) ,Rating,  cf -s ,cf ,p ,cf ,and,cf  -or) , 
XS) , 
s o r t  (Xs, Book) . 
Given the database listed in Figure 1 (consisting of only two potential dates), 
the goal create(BooX:) will yield the response: 
Book = [(pat,0.832),(nicky,0.426)1. 
The casual nature of the dating example should not obscure the underlying 
seriousness of the SOLVE: meta-interpreter. Consider, for example, a medi- 
cal diagnosis application. In this contest, potential dates and their perceived 
characteristics correspond to prospective diseases and symptom manifesta- 
tions, respectively. Sub-hypotheses, like ricfi(X), correspond to clinical syn- 
dromes or intermediate diagnoses. Datiilg rules are analogous to  text-book 
medical knowledge and heuristic inferences of experienced experts. Under 
this interpretation, the evaluation of a prospective date is analogous to the 
diagnosis of a certain patient, and the goal creat €(Book) would probably be- 
come rank(Diseases). Given a certain lino~vledge-base and a set of observed 
symptoms, this goal gives a list of all the potential diseases that this patient 
might have, in decreasing order of Iilielil~ood. 
Conclusions and Future Research 
The validity of alterna.tive belief Ianguages can be investigated in two different 
and complementary methodologies: analytical, and empirical. The analytic 
approach is chiefly concerned with compa.ring belief calculi to  well-known 
norma.tive criteria., e.g. probal~ility theory or predica.te logic. This line of 
resea.rch leads quite clea.rly to the realiza.tion tha,t, not unlike the humans that 
they attempt to model, all rule-hased belief ca.lculi contain varying degrees 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-89-69 
of normative violations. Nonetheless, the extent of these violations is not 
well understood, and the sensitivity of the system's advice to such violations 
is still an open question. 
In spite of their normative deficiencies, rule-based belief calculi are widely- 
used in commercial expert systems. Moreover, it might be that a careful 
design of the underlying knowledge-base might ensure that normative viola- 
tions are kept to a minimum. With that in mind, there is a crucial need for an 
empirical  approach to investigating the external validity of alternative belief 
calculi. This line of research simulates real settings in which the expertise of 
human subjects is elicited and represented via different belief languages. The 
experiments then pit the systems' recommendations with (a) the judgment 
of the humans Chat they claim to model, and (13) an external norm - a gold 
standard - which may be a either a credible expert opinion, or, preferably, 
the actual "true state of the world." 
The empirical approach is very novel. There exist only a few empirical stud- 
ies which pit a.lternative belief languages, e.g. Mitchell [17], Yadrick et a1 
[37], Wise [36], and Schocken [24]. These studies attempt to understand the 
conditions under which one belief language performs better than another. 
Therefore, they h a ~ e  important prescriptive impIications on knowledge engi- 
neering, 
One limitation that inhibited more research in this direction has been a lack of 
a common benchmark environment. Such an environment ought to simulate 
the mechanics of rule-based inference and, at the same time, allow a great 
deal of design flexibility in terms of tinkering with alternative belief calculi 
without touching the rest of the system. We feel that Prolog and meta- 
interpret.ers like SOLIfE provide a very flexible environment in which such 
experiments can be carried out. ?Ve hope that these and similar tools will 
promote further research on the questionable validity of rule-based inference 
under uncertainty. 
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6 Appendix: Implementation Details 
6.1 Knowledge Representat ion 
Consider the set of rules and facts depicted in Figure 1. Let us assume 
that this knowledge-base is physically stored and maintained in a standard 
text file called KBASE. How can we merge the contents of this file with a 
standard Prolog database? ideally, we would like to simply prove the goal 
consult(kbase). This, however, won't work, since the K B A S E  contains non- 
standard Prolog terms. This difference may he resolved through the following 
predicate: 




Each application of the system predicate op(P, A,T) defines the token T 
as a new, non-standard Prolog operator. The precedence and associativity 
properties of T are given by P and A, respectively. The actual values of 
these arguments vary from one Prolog implementation to another and are of 
little interest. 
6.2 The CF' Calculus 
The C F  calculus presented in Section 2.2 is implemented below through the 
four predicates < c f -and, c f -or, c f -s, cf -p >: 
/* CF Boolean conditioning functions. 
input : Be1 1, Be12 
output: Be1 */ 
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/* CF sequen t i a l  propagation f u n c t i o n .  
i n p u t  : Bel-e: c u r r e n t  b e l i e f  i n  premise, 
Bel-rule:  r u l e ' s  degree of b e l i e f ,  
output  : Bel: a t t e n u a t e d  r u l e ' s  degree  of b e l i e f  */ 
cf ,s(Bel,e,Bel,rule, Bel) : - max(0, Bel-e ,Bel,max) , 
B e 1  is  Bel- ru le  * Bel-max. 
/* Binary CF p a r a l l e l  combination f u n c t i o n .  
i n p u t :  X , Y :  two CFJs of independent r u l e s  which render  
evidence t o  t h e  same hypothes is )  
ou tpu t :  Z: combined CF */ 
cf,p,2(X,Y,Z) :- ((X=<O,Y>=O) ; (x>=o,Y=<o)), 
abs  (X,A), abs(Y ,B) , min(A,B,C), 
Z i s  (X+Y)/(I-C), ! .  
/* n-ary CF p a r a l l e l  combination f u n c t i o n  */ 
i npu t :  X s :  a  s e t  (cf (h 1 e l ) ,  . . . , c f  (h 1 en))  
ou tpu t :  Bel:  c f ( h l e 1 ,  . . . ,  en) 
The explicit omission of the first va.ria,ble in the cf -p function underscores the 
fact that the C F  1angua.ge ignores pl-ior beliefs. This can be seen clearly in 
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the definition of the base-fact of cf-p, which models the state of insuficient 
reason (Savage, [23]). This case, which is chara.cterized by an empty set of 
degrees of belief, causes c f -p to assign a posterior belief of 0 to the hypothesis 
in question. This is consistent with the additive C F  philosophy, in which 
the absence of any relevant evidence on h causes the belief in h to neither 
increase nor decrease. In a Bayesian language, one would normally model 
this case by setting the posterior belief in the hypothesis to its prior belief. 
6.3 The Bayesian Calculus 
The Bayesian calculus presented in Section 2.3 is implemented in below 
through the four predicates < b-and, b-or, b-s, b-p >: 
/* Bayesian Boolean Condi t ioning:  */ 
/* Bayesian s e q u e n t i a l  p ropaga t ion  f u n c t i o n .  
I n p u t :  Bel-e: P(e)  
PO: P ( h ) ,  
91: P ( e l h ) ,  
Q2: P ( e l h ) ,  
Output:  PO: P(h)  , 
PI: P q e l h ) ,  
P2: P ' ( e l h )  */ 
/* Bayesian P a r a l l e l  combinat ion f u n c t i o n :  
i n p u t :  Bels :  a set of 3 -p lace  degrees  of  b e l i e f  ( B e l l , , . . , B e l n )  
P r i o r :  p r i o r  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s ,  P(h) 
Output : P: p o s t e r i o r  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s ,  P (h le1 ,  ..., en)  
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b-p([Priorl,],Bels,P) :- 
mult (Bels, Product -Odds) , 
Odds is (~rior/(i-prior)) * Product-Odds, 
P is Odds/(l+Odds). 
rnult(C1 ,I). 
mult( [[XI ,X211Xs1 ,Product) : - mult(Xs ,Bel,Xs) , 
Product is (Xl/X2)*Bel,Xs. 
/* A more efficient, tail-recursive version of MULT 
can be defined as follows: */ 
mult (List ,Product) : - multl (List, 1 ,Product) . 
multl([],Accumulator,Accumulator). 
multl( [ [- ,X1 ,X2] 1 Xs] ,Acumulator,Product) : - 
NewAccumulat or is Accumulator*X1/X2, 
mult 1 (Xs , NewAccumulator , Product) . 
6.4 Miscellaneous predicates 
The following predicates complet,e the definition of the SOL?'E meta-interpreter: 
bagof(X,G,,) :- asserta(found(mark)),G,asserta(found(X)),fail. 
bagof (, , , ,L) : - collectFound ( [I ,M)  , ! ,L=M. 
collectFound(Lin,Lout):- getNext(X),!,collectFound([XlLin],Lout). 
collectFound(Lin,Lin). 
getNext (X) : - retract (f ound(X) ) , ! ,not (X==mark) . 
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/* the following predicate sorts a list of pairs [x,Y] 
in decreasing order of Y */ 
sort (CX IXs] ,Ys) : - sort (Xs ,Zs) , insert (X,Zs,Ys) . 
sort ([I , [I . 
insert(CXl,X21 ,[I, CCXl,X211). 
insert(CXi,X23 ,CCYlyY21 IYsl , E[Y1,Y21 IZs]) :- 
X2>Y2, insert ([XI ,X2] ,Ys ,Zs) . 
6.5 Cooking Instructions 
The practice of incremental enhancements of meta-interpreters was ana- 
lyzed by Sterling [31]. This analysis, which draws its terminology from 
object progra.mming, suggests tha.t Prolog meta-interpreters are analogous 
to Lisp Flavors. Using Sterling's 1a.nguage (which is underlined), the mod- 
ules PARSE a.nd < F A ,  F-p, F-and, F-01. > a.re orthogonal enhancements 
to the SOLVE fia.vor, in tha,t the computations necessa.ry for incorporat- 
ing them are completely sepasa.te. The P A R S E  predicate amounts to a 
beha(vi0ra.l enha.ncement : it extends the computation performed by SOLVE 
without changing the meta-goal of the enhanced meta-interpreter. This is 
done simply by a,dding the parsing predica.tes to SOLVE'S theory. The fla- 
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vor solve(H,Bel, Fs, F-p, F-and, F-or) is a structural enhancement of the 
vannila flavor solve(H), in that the extra arguments < Fs, F-p, F ~ n d ,  F-or > 
(which are bound to a fixed belief calculus < f s, f -p, f a n d ,  f -or >) are used 
t o  compute Be1 as H is being solved. 
So, now that all the ingredients have been provided, the creation of a rule- 
based inference system is merely a matter of mixing flavors. Let p and q be 
two Prolog predicates whose exknded theory is stored in two text files whose 
names are also p and g, respectively (the extended theory of p includes p7s 
theory and the theory of all the predicates mentioned in p's theory. In what 
follows, when we say add p to q or mix I:, and q we mean "prove the goals 
consult(p) and consudt(q)." 
With this terminology in mind, to prepare a CF-oriented inference system 
follow this set of irsstrractions: 
1. Create a CF-oriented knowledge-ba.se a.nd saxre it in a file called K B A S E  
2. Prove the god  de f ine-sp12tuz 
3. Mix the C F  PARSE predica.te with the SOLVE flavor 
4. Add the predicates c f s, cf -p, c.f -a??.(], cf -or 
5 .  Mix the resulting inference system with the knowledge-base K B A S E  
6. Confirm the hypothesis h and compute its posterior certainty-factor by 
proving the meta-goal solve(h, Bel, c f s ,  c f  -p, c f a n d ,  c f -or). 
To prepare a Bayesian-oriented inference system, follow this set of instruc- 
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tions: 
1. Create a Bayesian-oriented knowledge-base and save it in a file called 
ICBASE 
2. Prove the goal de f ine-syntax 
3. Mix the Bayesian PARSE predicate with the SOLVE flavor 
4. Add the predicates b-s, b-11, b-and, b-or 
5. Mix the resulting inference system with the knowledge-base KBASE 
6. Confirm the hypothesis h and compute its posterior belief by proving 
the meta-goal solve(h, Bel, bps, b-11, b-and, b-or). 
6.6 A Note on Function Variables in Prolog 
Throughout the paper, the belief calculi functions were specified using the 
conventional algebraic notation Y = f (X) .  In Prolog, this notation has 
no meaning. Instead, the logic progra.mming equivalent of the computation 
Y = f (S) is normally the predica.te f (S, Y). This goal is made to succeeds 
always, unifying the va3ria.ble 1'- to the value f (X). For example, the successor 
function s (X)  = X + 1 is implemented tl~rough the predicate s(X, Y) : 
-Y is X+1. VV11en we a.sk Prolog to prove t,he goal 4 3 ,  Y), Prolog succeeds 
and binds Y to 4 as a. side-effect. 
Now, things become slightly more complicated if we wish to treat the func- 
tor f itself as a variable. This is precisely ~sl la t  is required in the SOLVE 
meta-interpreter, which uses a belief calculus without knowing its exact spec- 
ification. From a design standpoint, the ideal solution is to pass the four 
predicates < f s, f-p, f a n d ,  f -or > as parameters to the SOLVE predi- 
cate, creating a goal of the form solz~e(h,Bel, f s ,  f-p, f-and, f-or). In this 
context, the predicates < f -s, f -p, f -and, f-or > are meant to  instantiate 
the variables < Fs, F-p,F-and, F-or > in SOLVE. However, this type 
of quantification is beyond the scope of first-order predicate calculus. This 
limitation can be overcome via Prolog's "univ" =.. operator. Among other 
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things, this operator may be used to bind variables to functions. For exam- 
ple, consider the following APPLY1 predica.te, defined in by Sterling and 
Shapiro, 1331): 
applyl(F,Xs) :- Goal=..[FI~sl, Goal. 
The goal applyl(f, X's) causes Profog to apply the function f to the argument 
list Xs. For example, the goal apply 1 (s, [3, Y]) will succeed, resulting with 
Y = 4. 
In this paper we define a more polverf~11 version of APPLY, as follows: 
Defined that way, the first argument of A P P  LI', Predicate, can be either an 
atomic symbol naming a predicate, or, alternatively, a term representing a 
predicate with some of its arguments supplied. For example, apply (s, [3, Y ] )  
will yield Y = 4, and so will apply(s(3), [E']). As yet another example of 
the utility of APPLY, coilsider the following numeric computation of the 
square-root function, using Newton's approximation formula: 
sqrt(X,Y) :- apply(newton(0.01) , [x,Y]). 
newton(Epsilon,X,Y) :- iterate(Epsilon,X,Y ,l) . 
iterate(Epsilon,X,Y,Y) :- Diff is X-Y*Y,abs(Diff,Z),Z=<Epsilon,!. 
iterate(Epsilon,X,Y,Z) :- NewZ is (X/Z+Z)/2, 
iterate(Epsilon,X,Y,Newz) 
Defined that way, the parameter of the .NET.TTI'ON predicate, currently set 
to 0.01, specifies the precision level of the SQRT function. That is, Y is 
guaranteed to be within a 0.01 neigl~l~oshood of the true value of a. In 
this example, sqrt(4, Y) will yield Y = 2.0006. 
To sum up, we see that the term representing the predicate in our definition 
of APPLY is the equivalent of a clostire in a Lisp-based functional language. 
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